Posted by
Michael Avari on Tuesday, December 15, 2009 3:19:49 PM
During an interview on 60 Minutes on Sunday, President Obama called bankers who were bailed out by the United States “fat cats” who “don’t get it” 1.
Why ought we to be surprised that bankers would behave in a way to
maximize their income, when risks are assumed by the government? Some
predicted a bailout of certain banks through the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) would fail to restore the financial system to health,
primarily because it makes financial decisions political by vesting in
the Executive branch discretionary authority to save favored
institutions.2
The theory behind TARP was: by buying
“toxic” assets—specialized securities that had no market, the
descending prices of which destroyed bank value—banks would be restored
to health and normal operations would resume. TARP did not purchase a
single toxic asset. Instead, taxpayer funds were exchanged for shares
or warrants (options on shares) in banks, credit card companies,
including American Express and Discover, an insurance company, AIG, and
two car companies, GM and Chrysler. Chrysler was owned by a private
equity firm, Cerberus, in which former Vice President Dan Quayle is a
partner. TARP funds were also given to auto parts suppliers and
investment funds including the highly successful BlackRock.3
Taxpayer funds were thus dispatched to rescue any institution approved
by the Treasury Department and wealthy private investors.

Central bankers and economists speak of
the “moral hazard”, defined as “the inducement to engage in riskier
behavior when safeguards such as insurance are in place.” 4
This is precisely the hazard in which we have fallen by not allowing
inefficient banks and companies to fail and by preventing the market
from reallocating their capital and labor.
We now learn that two beneficiaries of
TARP funds, Goldman Sachs (GS) and AIG, were involved in an internecine
relationship between 2004 and 2006 in which GS insured the toxic
securities of other banks and reinsured those securities with AIG, thus
lading it with heavy risk.5 When the market sank in 2007
and 2008, TARP funds saved GS’ losses on $22 billion of such trades.
It ought to be evident that if such trades have a high profit
potential, largely because of their obscurity and complexity, and no
downside because the taxpayer insures against “too big to fail”, the
moral hazard is elevated.
Not all the bankers believe in “too big to fail”. The head of JPMorgan, Jaime Dimon, writing in the Washington Post
said, “Creating the structures to allow for the orderly failure of a
large financial institution starts with giving regulators the authority
to facilitate failures when they occur. Under such a system, a failed
bank's shareholders should lose their value; unsecured creditors should
be at risk and, if necessary, wiped out.” 6 This is putting
risk where risk belongs, directly on the owners of the business, the
shareholders, and not the public at large. We need reforms that would
encourage the market, not the government, to allocate capital to
businesses better able to manage risk and return for their
shareholders, provided the requisite accounting transparency exposes
irregular or exotic transactions.
At a recent forum sponsored by The Wall Street Journal,
an advisor to President Obama, Paul Volcker, the former head of the
Federal Reserve Board under Presidents Carter and Reagan, challenged
his fellow bankers, “Wake up, gentlemen … your response is inadequate” 7
as he lambasted financial “innovation” that created the complex
securities distorting the social and economic missions of banks to lend
prudently. Volcker amusingly remarked, the best example of financial
innovation is the ATM machine.
He also deplored the exorbitant
personal rewards that have become incentives for hyperkinetic trading
and financial engineering. While it is not wise for a pay czar,
Congress, or regulators to determine or jawbone compensation, it is
unfair to ask taxpayers to subsidize compensation for decisions that
erode capitalism. The answer is straightforward: end the business tax
deduction for bonuses, options, and other executive perks, and place a
limit on how much salary can be subsidized by the taxpayer as a normal
business expense. If the shareholders wish to pay their employees more
than that salary, they have the liberty to do so from their company’s
profits and it should not be the public’s business, nor come from other
taxpayers’ pockets.
Is the Fed unwittingly contributing to
the moral hazard? In a rush to institute stop-gap facilities after the
Bear Stearns meltdown in 2008, the Fed established the Primary Dealer
Credit Facility (PDCF). Primary dealers are a select group of 22
domestic and international banks who have the privilege of trading
directly with the Fed and borrowing from PDCF to finance their
portfolio of securities. The effect is to open another discount window
(the Fed facility that lends directly to institutions) to only an
exclusive set of banks: a nefarious misuse of public funds especially
when funds are available at or near 0% interest.
Anna Schwartz, the venerable economist
at the National Bureau for Economic Research, argued in 1992, “Discount
window accommodation to insolvent institutions, whether banks or
nonbanks, misallocates resources. Political decisions substitute for
market decisions. Institutions that have failed the market test of
viability should not be supported by the Fed’s money issues.” 8
She observed about the 2008 crisis, "They [the Fed and Treasury] should not be recapitalizing firms that should be shut down." 9 The risk of failure in the market, as all other businesses face, imposes prudence on financial decisions.
It is no wonder, then, that Congressman
Ron Paul (R, TX) successfully amended the financial services overhaul
bill to audit the Fed. Restoring sound monetary policy by the central
bank is the first step toward restoring prudence to all banks.
Also appears on the Examiner
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[1] “White House Lashes Out at Bankers.” The Wall Street Journal, 12 Dec. 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126073152465089651.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection
[2] Avari, Michael. “The Treasury's Hedge Fund?” American Civility, 7 Oct. 2008 http://americancivility.us/american-civility/2008/10/7/the-treasurys-hedge-fund.html
[3] Bailout Recipients.” ProPublica, http://bailout.propublica.org/main/list/index
[4] “The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility.” Current Issues, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Volume 15, Number 4, August 2009 http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci15-4.pdf
[5] “Goldman Fueled AIG Gambles.” The Wall Street Journal, 12 Dec. 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704201404574590453176996032.html?mod=WSJ_hp_mostpop_read
[6] Dimon, Jamie. “No more ‘too big to fail'.” Washington Post, 13 Nov. 2009 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/12/AR2009111209924.html
[7] “Paul Volcker: Think More Boldly.” The Wall Street Journal, 14 Dec. 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704825504574586330960597134.html
[8] Schwartz, Anna J.: “The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount Window.” The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Sep./Oct. 1992 http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/09/Misuse_Sep_Oct1992.pdf
[9] “Bernanke Is Fighting the Last War.” The Wall Street Journal, 18 Oct. 2008 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122428279231046053.html